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I. The Establishment and Decline of the Empire
Most empires, as history readers know, have a way of putting up a
strong front for a considerable time after decay has set in. This observa-
tion conveniently fits the empire called the Rule against Perpetuities.
The Rule began three centuries ago by laying claim to a vague, un-
defined territory. "Where will you stop... ?" asked Lord Nottingham
of himself in the Duke of Norfolk's Case.' "I will tell you where I will
stop: I will stop where-ever any visible Inconvenience doth appear
... "he replied. The Rule then grew in a manner typical of the com-
mon law, by judges finding inconvenience here and no inconvenience
there, invoking for support, often imprecisely, a host of policies, taboos,
and doctrines. In the late nineteenth century John Chipman Gray put
an end to this disorganized rationality by staking out the limits of the
Rule in one sentence: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than tventy-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest."2 By virtue of his erudition, his rigorous logic, his dog-
matic style, and his position as the first great teacher of property law at
Harvard, Gray became enthroned as not just the leading authority on
the Rule but as the authority. He changed the republic into an empire
ruled by himself.
Some English scholars regarded Gray as a usurper and resented the
deference paid to him by English courts. Among these was Charles
Sweet, himself an authority on property law. Said Sweet of Gray's
method of reducing complexity to apparent simplicity:
[I]n their systematic treatises on the English law of real property,
American lawyers seem to treat it as if it were a collection of rules
drawn up by one legislator at one time, and therefore capable of
1. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 (1682).
2. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINsr P.RtPErtrIFs § 201 (4th ed. R. Gray ed. 1942 (J. C.
Gray published the first edition in 1886). This sentence, like E = MC2, was the pinnacle
atop a very complex and interrelated theoretical edifice which Gray took some four
hundred pages in his first edition to explain.
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being classified under leading principles. In the attempt to subject
the law of real property to this painful process, 'something has to
break' (to use one of Gray's Americanisms), and any anomalies
which suffer fracture are thrown away as useless. This brutal way
of treating the English law of real property commends itself to
our modern judges, for it saves a good deal of trouble, but it would
have scandalized the conveyancers of the last generation.3
When Sweet's numerous articles failed to arrest the growing influence
of Gray, Sweet attempted to cut Gray down to size by damning him
as a heretic:
The fact that Mr. Gray holds heretical views on an important
question of English real property law does not seem to be gener-
ally known, for the tendency of our judges is to regard him as
orthodox, if not infallible. Thus in Re Hollis' Hospital ([1899]
2 Ch. 540) Byrne J. preferred the opinion of Mr. Gray to that of
Mr. Challis on a question of real property law . . . ; and in Re
Ashforth ([1905] I Ch. 535) Farwell L.J. . . . said that the
opinion of Mr. Joshua Williams-to the effect that a legal con-
tingent remainder cannot be void for remoteness-had been 'dis-
placed' by Mr. Gray. If this is so, Mr. Gray has also 'displaced' the
opinion of Mr. Fearne, the Real Property Commissioners, Mr.
Preston, Mr. Charles Butler, Lord St. Leonards, Mr. Burton, Mr.
Leake, and Mr. Challis, all of whom held the same view as Mr.
Joshua Williams. This is a remarkable achievement .... 4
And a remarkable achievement it was indeed. In spite of Sweet's pro.
tests, Gray became the fountainhead of authority in England and-
despite the later lamentations of Professor Richard Powell5-in Amer-
ica.
In the last 25 years two men have led effective assaults on the Rule,
one indirectly, the other directly. The first significant tumult was
excited by Professor Myres McDougal of Yale, who shook property
scholars out of their mindless worship of orthodoxy. With one brilliant
stroke, McDougal in 1942 eviscerated the volume of the Restatement of
Property that dealt with future interests.6 At the same time, in the same
3. Sweet, John Chipman Gray, 31 L.Q. REv. 338, 339 (1915).
4. Sweet, Limitations of Land to Unborn Generations, 29 L.Q. REv. 304 n.2 (1913).
5. Because "vested" as used in most other contexts is an inaccurate word to describe
what interests are valid under the Rule, and because the word "vested" conceals the
important social policy underlying the Rule, Professor Powell believes the Rule should
be formulated as a rule against specific fetterings of property found socially inconvenient.
His position is cogently stated at 5 R. PowELL, TuE LAW OF REAL PRoPEr TY 767 (1962),
and is adopted by 4 RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY §§ 370-.382 (1944).
6. McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Yersus Clarification and Reform,
55 Htav. L. REv. 1077 (1942).
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article, he presented the most exacting, scientific, and comprehensive
framework ever formulated for the analysis of future interests problems.
Among other things McDougal sought to free property law from con-
ceptual congeries, such as "interest" and "vest", which conceal problems
by lumping together problems, facts, policies, doctrines, and judicial
response. His outraged indignation at the failure of judges and scholars
to examine the policy bases for doctrines has had a notable impact on
books and articles in the property field since 1948, the year McDougal
and Haber published their provocative casebook. No one has con-
tributed more to professional introspection.
Soon after McDougal brought some fresh air into property law, Pro-
fessor W. Barton Leach began in earnest his attack upon the Rule
against Perpetuities in its orthodox form. Successor by mesne investi-
tures to Gray's property chair at Harvard, Leach himself tells what
motivated him:
I had been teaching perpetuities since 1929; but two circum-
stances arising in the year 1952 compelled me to think about the
subject-a novel and refreshing experience. First, in an unguarded
moment I undertook, with Mr. Owen Tudor, to write the Part
in Am. L. Prop. on the common-law Rule, and it hardly seemed
appropriate just to condense Gray. Second, I spent a sabbatical
term lecturing on the subject at Oxford; and I had to say some-
thing which would keep the students awake and in attendance, for
at Oxford all lectures are optional and the examination system is
such that the lecturer must cajole his class into attendance without
the American-type knout of bad marks if they do not.8
With an acid wit both lethal and therapeutic, Leach heaped scorn on
such hobgoblins of orthodoxy as the fertile octogenarian, tie unborn
widow, the magic gravel pit, the fertile decedent, and the precocious
toddler (Leach joyfully supplied the names). He then embraced the wait-
and-see and cy pres doctrines, which he believed would exorcize these
apparitions.9 In so doing, if I may return to my original metaphor,
Leach has played Constantine to Gray's Augustus. These doctrines will
undoubtedly have as corrosive an impact on the Rule as Gibbon thought
Christianity had on the Romans.
7. M. MCDOUGAL & D. HABER, PROPERTY, WALTH, LAND: ALLOCaTIoN, PLAN.NGc &
DEvELoPmrNT (1948).
8. W. LEca & J. LOGAN, CAsES ON FUrURE INTEREST AND EsrATE PLANN.G 835 (1951).
9. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAnv.
L. R.Ev. 721 (1952).
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II. The Modem Rule Against Perpetuities
Now comes Professor Robert Lynn with an account of the empire
after Leach called The Modern Rule Against Perpetuities.° Lynn's
purposes are basically two: (1) to deconsecrate Gray's Rule by a careful,
critical examination of how the Rule has been applied or avoided in
modern decisions; (2) to analyze the reforms of the Rule that have been
adopted in one-quarter of the states as well as in England and the Com-
monwealth countries, and to provide the courts with guides to decision
under the doctrines of wait-and-see and cy pres.
Lynn does not purport to make any new earth-shaking theoretical
contribution. Nor does he suggest any new methods of reform or any
ways to reunite the distinguished perpetuity scholars who have had deep
disagreements about reform. The book is significant because-or, if
you prefer, in spite--of its limited scope. The two tasks Lynn under-
took badly needed doing, for reasons subsequently noted.
A. Lynn's Realistic Examination of Orthodox Doctrine
Lynn's first objective is accomplished with a deft and sagacious
analysis which makes his book especially rewarding in a field where
the cases are notable for their obscure jargon and ostensible obeisance
to the past. Each generation is saddled with-one might even say en-
slaved by-the language of preceding generations. This makes it very
difficult to determine what is actually happening in perpetuities cases.
Using orthodox analysis, and giving traditional justifications, courts
exclude many factors which one would ordinarily assume to affect the
result. Yet orthodoxy has given us a semblance of order. It has done
this by devising a conceptual system and making it pervasive, so that
values and conditions that cannot be standardized and programmed
are disregarded; by adjusting function to concepts rather than by
adjusting concepts to function; by treating concepts as having a uni-
form meaning rather than being regulated by pragmatic prudence and
policies; and by developing a closed system of high-level abstractions
to allot resources, which we are assured is the only right method and
is omnicompetent. In so doing, orthodoxy has made sound empirical
analysis of the cases exceedingly difficult.
10. Lynn notes that history buffs may be confused by the title. R. LYNN, TimE MoDtRN
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 194 n.82 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LYNN]. Gray's Rule used
to be called the modern Rule against Perpetuities to distinguish it from the rule of
Whitby v. Mitchell, which was known as the old Rule against Perpetuities. To Lynn,
however, Gray's is the old Rule.
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Fortunately, Professor Lynn does not regard the cases as impene-
trable. He does not bring to them the orthodox set, nor is he mes-
merized by the formal rightness of orthodox doctrine or deceived by
its words. He perceives that the meaning of such protean concepts
as "interest" and "vest" is not unchanging and that the interrelations
of these concepts and the ongoing process of decision-making are as
complex and various as the texture of life itself. According to Lynn
the meaning is made up by judges as they go along in a continuous
series of existential judgmental acts:
The fact is that the Rule Against Perpetuities lacks the defini-
tive qualities popularly attributed to it. The Rule is never any-
thing more than a point of departure. The rules of construction
are in some respects as potent a weapon in the hands of the courts
as the Rule itself, for the fate of many a dispositive instrument has
hinged upon construction: the court may accord to the Rule
Against Perpetuities only passing reference and use it to admin-
ister the coup de grdce."
Thus, in Lynn's view, Gray's statement of the Rule, with its 400-page
explanation, is an incomplete, though enormously useful, Baedeker
in a land charted case by case.
1. Functional Equivalents Dissected
Two fascinating chapters Lynn devotes to the classification of in-
terests.'- According to orthodox doctrine, classification of interests is
indispensable to proper application of the Rule against Perpetuities.
The orthodox process moves this way: Words of the instrument
> classified and labeled ) produce result.
The first classification problem Lynn examines is the dichotomy
between (a) "possibilities of reverter" and "rights of entry" and (b)
"contingent executory interests."13 The former interests are exempt
from the Rule; contingent executory interests are subject to it. This
insidious distinction leads to conclusions that cannot be justified
rationally and, not unexpectedly, to strange judicial contortions to
avoid the conclusions compelled by doctrine. The resulting picture
is so wondrously bizarre, and so completely unbelievable to anyone
not familiar with future interests, that it needs to be sketched here.
11. LYNN 201.
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Case 1. T devises two acres to the Board of Education so long
as used for school purposes, and upon cessation of school use the
two acres are to revert to T's heirs. The devise is entirely valid. The
Board has a fee simple determinable. T's heirs have a possibility of
reverter exempt from the Rule.
If the transfer of the two acres is by deed rather than by devise,
the grantor's heirs have an executory interest ("nemo est haeres
viventis"). This violates the Rule and is void. The grantor now has
a possibility of reverter which by a second piece of paper (deed,
declaration of trust, or will) he may transfer to his heirs. 14
Case 2. T devises two acres to the Board of Education so long
as used for school purposes, and upon cessation of school use the
two acres are to revert to B and his heirs. The Board has a fee simple
determinable. The gift to B is an executory interest and is void
under the Rule. T's heirs have a possibility of reverter.'r
If the gift to B is made in a separate residuary clause, the gift
to B is valid as the transfer of a possibility of reverter." Since a pos-
sibility of reverter can be created only in the transferor (if by deed)
or in his heirs (if by will), to make this result consistent with ortho-
dox doctrine we must assume the clause creating the fee simple
determinable and the residuary clause are operative at two different
times. The first clause creates the possibility of reverter in the trans-
feror; a moment passes; the subsequent residuary clause transfers
the possibility of reverter to B. 17 However, if the gift to B is made in
a codicil rather than in a residuary clause, the will and codicil have
been treated as one piece of paper operative at one time; the gift to
B is an executory interest and is void."
If the transfer of the two acres is by deed rather than by devise,
and two pieces of paper are used, the gift to B is valid. One court
has even held two pieces of paper are not necessary; two sentences
on one piece of paper are sufficient to create a reversionary interest
and transfer it to a transferee.19 Here again, this result is consistent
14. McCrory School Dist. v. Brogden, 231 Ark. 664, 333 S.V.2d 246 (1960); Fletcher v.
Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 448 (1950).
15. Institution for Savings v. Home for Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 189 N.E. 301
(1923).
16. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).
17. L. SIMEs & A. SMITE, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1241 (2d ed. 1956) put it
trenchantly: "This is in effect assuming that the testator died twice."
18. In Re Estate of Pruner, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960).
19. Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation District, 51 Cal. 2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958).
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with orthodox doctrine only if we assume the second sentence is
operative a moment of time after the first sentence is operative. °
Case 3. T devises two acres to the Board of Education, but if the
land ceases to be used for school purposes T's heirs shall have a right
to re-enter. The Board has a fee simple subject to condition subse-
quent. T's heirs have a right of entry exempt from the Rule.
If the transfer of the two acres is by deed rather than by devise,
the grantor's heirs have an executory interest which violates the
Rule. The Board of Education then has a fee simple absolute.2'
Case 4. T devises two acres to the Board of Education, but if the
land ceases to be used for school purposes B and his heirs shall have
a right to re-enter. The gift to B is an executory interest and is void
under the Rule. The Board of Education has a fee simple absolute.-2
If, however, the gift to B is not made in the same sentence but is
made in a subsequent clause in the will, the clauses have been
treated as operating at different and successive moments of time;
hence the gift to B is the transfer of a right of entry and is v, lid.m
Case 5. 0 conveys two acres to the Board of Education for $100,
but if the land ceases to be used for school purposes, 0, his heirs, or
assigns may repay the purchase price and demand a reconveyance of
the property. It has been held that 0 has an option, not a right of
entry, which option violates the Rule..2 4 It has also been held to the
contrary: that 0 has a valid right of entry, not an option.2 - If 0 has
20. Controversies arising from givinga time sequence to purely conceptual events have
an ancient history. The great scintilla juris controversy raged in England for three
hundred years before Parliament settled the matter in 1860. The issue unas whether a feoffee
to uses had seisin for any amount of time before seisin was taken by the Statute of Uses
and transferred to the cestui que use. See 7 IV. HOLiSWORrHi, HIsroRY OF FxcLst LAW
137-41 (1925).
Another momentous dispute arose with the invention of simultaneous seisin to protect
the purchase money mortgagee from dower, liens, and other prior claims against the mort-
gagor. "The idea is that title shot into the grantee and out of him again into the
purchase money mortgagee so fleetingly-quasi uno flattu, in one breath, as it vere--that
no other interest had time to fasten itself to it." G. OsBoRNE, H&oNooK ON THE A OF
MORTGAGES 557 (1951).
Giving a time sequence to conceptual events also bases the rule that an express forfeiture
restraint against involuntary alienation will be given effect. As soon as a creditor executes
his judgment on the debtor's interest the interest ceases eo instanti and the creditor has
nothing. See J. DuEMiNmIR, PEuErurrms LAw IN Acrbo, 136 (1962).
21. Edward John Noble Hosp. v. Board of Foreign Missions, 13 Misc. 2d 918, 176
N.Y.S.2d 157 (1958).
22. McGaughey v. Spencer County Bd. of Educ., 285 Ky. 769, 149 S.W.d 519 (1941).
23. Knowles v. South County Hosp., 87 R.I. 303, 140 A.2d 499 (1958).
24. Bates v. Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W.2d 943 (1950); Gange v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51,
237 P.2d 196 (1951). Why should O's interest violate policy if he has to repay the purchase
price in order to retake the premises and not violate policy if he may re-enter free of
charge?
25. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So. 2d 537 (1956).
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the right to demand reconveyance free of charge upon breach of
the condition, it has been held that 0 has a covenant not subject to
the Rule against Perpetuities.2
The results in the above cases follow from the application, or avoid-
ance, of three rules: (1) The label of an interest is controlled by the
words of the instrument; (2) The label is also controlled by who the
person is in whom the interest is initially created; if the interest is
created in the grantor or in testator's heirs, a possibility of reverter or
right of entry is created; if the interest is created in someone else, an
executory interest is created; (3) The label controls the result. Pos-
sibilities of reverter and rights of entry are exempt from the Rule.
Executory interests and options are subject to it.
Professor Lynn examines cases falling within the fact patterns of
Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4. (Unfortunately, he does not compare cases on
options to repurchase.) From this he concludes the obvious: answers
to perpetuities questions in these cases are not predictable by orthodox
doctrine.27 How, then, are cases decided? I shall examine Lynn's an-
swer to this question at a later point.
The major failing of the book in treating possibilities of reverters,
rights of entry, and executory interests is that Professor Lynn does not
offer any satisfactory way out of the maze. As a matter of policy, the
future interests in Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 should be treated alike. They
would be treated alike if the classification of interests were irrelevant
to result. The only sure way to accomplish this is to subject possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry to the Rule against Perpetuities. This
has been done in England, and it may be a satisfactory method of deal-
ing with the problem where the wait-and-see doctrine is also adopted.
However, there has been strong objection in this country to subjecting
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry to the Rule. First, lives-in-
being-plus-21-years has no functional relation to an appropriate time
limitation on forfeiture interests respecting the use of land. Second,
for the title searcher a fixed period of duration is preferable.28 Third,
some possibilities of reverter and rights of entry-such as those used in
oil, gas, or mineral leases and those relating to transmission, transpor-
tation, or highway purposes-should not be cut off by the Rule.
26. Cf. Greco v. Meadow River Coal & Land Co., 145 W. Va. 153, 113 S,E,2d 79 (1960).
27. For another examination of this area, which comes to the same conchnslon, see
Chaffin, Reverters, Rights of Entry, and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion and the
Tying Up Of Land, 31 FoRD. L. RFv. 303 (1962).
28. See Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reotercr
and Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. Rav. 807, 813-15 (1964).
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Modem American reform statutes have rejected the English ap-
proach. They usually have terminated possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry after a fixed period, such as 30 years. However, the
fixed-period approach preserves the importance of classification, and
hence the opportunity for lawyers or judges to effect a result by manip-
ulating labels. Professor Lynn believes the Kentucky statute abolishes
the importance of classification and makes equivalent the possibility
of reverter, the right of entry, and the contingent executory interest
following a fee.- Inasmuch as I drafted that statute I should like to
accept the bouquet. But I cannot. The difficulty is this: Some execu-
tory interests are functional equivalents of possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry (Cases 1 through 4 above). These interests should be
subject to the same rule limiting duration, whether it be the Rule
against Perpetuities or a fixed period rule or a rule terminating these
interests on equitable grounds. However, not all executory interests
are the functional equivalents of possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry. Some executory interests are the functional equivalents of
vested remainders.3 0 And some executory interests are the functional
equivalents of contingent remainders. Thus:
Case 6. T devises two acres to A and his heirs, but if A dies with-
out issue him surviving then to B and his heirs. A has a fee simple
subject to a shifting executory interest in B. The devise is wholly
valid under the Rule against Perpetuities.
Case 7. T devises two acres to A for life, remainder to A's issue
him surviving, but if A dies without issue him surviving then to B
and his heirs. A has a life estate, his issue have a contingent remain-
der, and B has an alternative contingent remainder. The devise is
wholly valid under the Rule against Perpetuities.
B's executory interest in Case 6 surely should be subject to the same
rule as B's contingent remainder in Case 7. That rule is presently
the Rule against Perpetuities.
If two rules with different time periods are involved, the problem is
how to divide up executory interests into (a) those that are functional
equivalents of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry (and subject
to a fixed-period rule) and (b) those that are functional equivalents of
remainders (and subject to the Rule against Perpetuities). Professor
Lynn does not meet this issue, and the Kentucky statute, in my judg-
29. LyNNi 25-26, 54 n.47.
30. See p. 168 infra.
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ment, does not resolve the problem in a wholly satisfactory manner.
The best way to resolve it, if a fixed-period rule is applied to possibil-
ities of reverter and rights of entry, appears to be this: use a 21-year
period for possibilities of reverter and rights of entry and couple this
with either (1) a general wait-and-see doctrine in perpetuities law or
(2) a general cy pres doctrine. Under either approach the practical
result would be that all of the future interests in Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, and
5 would be subject to a 21-year limitation. Under the causal-relation
test of wait-and-see there would be no measuring lives for the execu-
tory interests and options.3 1 Therefore they would be limited to 21
years. Under cy pres the court could reform the executory interests
and options by validating them for 21 years.
2. A Canard Interred
Before venturing into the second classification problem, that of
vested vs. contingent, Lynn buries the canard-slain long ago32 but
not yet interred-that an executory interest cannot vest in interest
before it vests in possession. He proposes "[a] more workable state-
ment . . . A contingent executory interest must be so created that
it will become possessory or be transformed into a vested remainder
or a vested estate, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."33 By "vested estate" he
means an interest not supported by a preceding life estate or term of
years that (a) is not presently possessory and (b) will certainly become
possessory in the future; for example, "$10,000 to B, now age two,
payable with accumulated income when B reaches 25." This interest
in B, which cannot be easily fitted into any of the categories of future
interests authorized by orthodox doctrine, is christened "vested estate"
by Professor Lynn, and thus may be born a new future interest.
3. Into the Quagmire of Vesting
The major classification problem which Lynn examines is the vested-
contingent dichotomy. The orthodox definitions of "vested" and "con-
tingent," which are used to classify an infinite number of dispositions,
bring to mind the words of T. S. Eliot in "Burnt Norton":
31. See J. DUKEMnNIER, supra note 20, at 88.
32. See L. SIMEs & A. S~irrH, supra note 17, § 1236; Dukeminier, Contingent Remainders
and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REv. 13, 23 (1958).




Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.34
"Vest" is a notorious word of many meanings. At common law it be-
came a wanton word because judges and scholars engaged in a type of
spurious reasoning aptly described many years ago by that renowned
fallacy-hunter, Walter Wheeler Cook: "The tendency to assume that
a word which appears in two or more rules, and so in connection
with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same
scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the
tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against." '
It has been said by a great many property scholars, and by some
believed, that "vested" takes its meaning solely from the words of the
dispositive instrument. The purposes of the rule in which "vested"
appeared were ignored. Those who have taken this view have assumed
that the fact that judicial decisions on their face purport to resort to
a vested-contingent dichotomy for solution is evidence of a profound
connection between classification of an interest and judicial response.
In the twentieth century this view has been strongly challenged,
first by Albert M. Kales of Northwestern30 and more recently by Myres
McDougal of Yale.37 Kales and McDougal thought the belief that the
dispositive language alone is important to be an illusion. They ex-
plained that, however artificial and disassociated from policy the rules
might appear, at least some of the judges some of the time have been
much concerned with policy. When these judges said the result fol-
lowed from the classification of the interest as "vested," when "vested"
became a key term in the litany of justification, the word necessarily
took on a meaning that was responsive to the practical problem and
the applicable policies. To reconcile reality and the belief that the
dispositive words controlled the classification of an interest as "vested"
or "contingent," the judges drew hair-splitting distinctions in lan-
guage, many of which only a casuist could follow. For almost every
34. T. S. ELIOT, Burnt Norton, in Four QuAaRT-s pt. 3, at 7 (1943).
35. -V. Coox, LOGICAL AiD LEGAL BASES or TH CoNrxcr OF LAws 159 (1942).
36. A. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTE ESrT AND ILLEGAL CoNDrros AND RsrrAmo s IN
ILLINOIS (1920). Lynn says this book was "misnamed" and Kales' influence "limited."
LYNN 20.
37. McDougal taught that the terms "vested" and "contingent" are "but verbal
counters which officials use in a great variety of contexts to effect a preferred distribution
of values." M. MCDOUGAL & D. HABER, supra note 7, at 309.
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rule of construction its opposite grew up. The criteria for classifica-
tion were phrased in vague and tautologous terms ("condition prece-
dent" was perhaps the most important). It was a poor judge indeed
who could not knead the rules of classification and construction to a
desired result. Thus-Kales and McDougal taught-a great house of
illusion and deception was built behind a facade (dispositive language)
erected upon a logical fault (ignoring purpose of classification).
Within it, for the past several centuries, judges distributed wealth,
advancing justifications which may or may not have compelled the
decisions.
Whatever view is taken of the usefulness of the vested-contingent
dichotomy and the attendant rules of construction, one essential fact
must be borne in mind. The dichotomy, with its attendant definitions,
in the final analysis can never yield answers whose words are rooted
in any more substantial reality than other words; whether judges are
moved by the closed and labyrinthine loops of language is a hypothesis
that can never be absolutely proven. The truth or falsity of the dichot-
omy can never be demonstrated because all the current ways to divide
interests into "vested" or "contingent" categories are tautological.
The definitions include as part of the facts the very judicial behavior
that the definitions purport to predict. Consider, for example, the now
classic definitions of vested remainders found in Gray's treatise. Sec-
tion 970 provides:
A vested remainder is defined as a future estate which takes effect
as a present estate immediately upon the expiration of the pre-
ceding estate or estates as originally limited, and is ready at every
moment during its continuance to come into possession when-
ever and however the preceding estates determine. That is to say,
a vested remainder is a future estate that is subject to no condi-
tion precedent except the termination of the preceding estate. 8
Note that the italicized words can be given meaning only by referring
to the action of a court declaring the remainder "takes effect," "is
ready," and is subject to "no condition precedent." Gray's definition
was perfectly, but unwittingly, depicted in a recent drawing by Stein-
berg, which appears on the opposite page.
Different definitions appear in the Restatement of Property, but
they are as tautologous as Gray's. A remainder is vested subject to
complete defeasance, says the Restatement, when "it is possible to
38. GRAY, supra note 2, at § 970 (emphasis added).
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Drawing by Steinberg; 0 1965 the New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
point to a person and to say that such a person would take, if all
interests including a prior right to a present interest should now
end."39 The phrase, when "it is possible to point to a person," does not
reveal who does the pointing. Nor does it specify under what circum-
stances the judge or the lawyer, or whoever does the pointing, points
and says, "such person would take."
In Professor Lynn's analysis of the vested-contingent dichotomy,
the influence of Kales and McDougal is evident. Lynn confirms their
theory that results are not always reached by first classifying interests
as vested or contingent. Ie concludes that recent cases "demonstrate
that classification of interests is not an invariable step in solving a
perpetuities question."4' 0 He finds that the cases fall roughly into six
types or categories: (1) cases exhibiting "relative familiarity with doc-
39. 2 R-STATFmENr OF PROPERTY § 157, comment p at 554 (19136).
40. LYNN 157.
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trinal niceties and consequent ease in application of technicality";
(2) cases where "classification of future interests is attempted along
orthodox lines and is achieved with little or no difficulty but in which
an alternative classification is permissible"; (3) cases where "classifica-
tion is attempted along orthodox lines and is not achieved"; (4) cases
where "partial classification of interests is attempted along orthodox
lines and is achieved with little or no difficulty"; (5) cases where "classi-
fication of interests is not attempted"; and (6) cases where "orthodox
doctrine is rejected." 41
In each category Lynn takes representatives cases and examines them
in some detail. Because traditional doctrine offers so many doors in
and out, it is often difficult to determine whether, and to what extent,
the doctrine is really influencing the judges or whether the judges are
manipulating the doctrine. The best one can do in examining the
cases is to bring to each a sensitive mind, free of predilections, and an
experience born of reading hundreds of cases in the field. Lynn does
this. He presents us with a m6lange of judicial attitudes and skills in
classifying interests. There are many fine judges who, without dis-
carding the orthodox mythology, appear to be unmythological, There
are others who demonstrate again the truth of F. C. S. Schiller's re-
mark: "Nothing has a greater hold on the human mind than nonsense
fortified with technicalities." There are, unhappily, only a few judges
who explicitly recognize the tautologous nature of orthodox doctrine,
reject it on that ground, and attempt an honest statement of the
factors that move decision.
Lynn does not collect all the cases of the last two or three decades
and place them in one or the other of these categories. His cases are
merely representative. We are not given any statistics that would per-
mit us to say, for example, that 40 per cent of the judges are skilled
in their use of doctrine or that in 30 per cent of the cases the doctrine
apparently compelled the result. Such statistics might be useful but
the time and effort required to amass them by an experienced perpe-
tuities hand would be a frivolous use of scholarship, considering how
few perpetuities experts there are and what needs to be done in the
way of policy examination and reform. Professor Lynn has proven
nothing statistically, but he has greatly increased our insight into the
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4. Lynn's Raid on the Inarticulate
Contemporary scholars agree with Lynn that many judges today do
not feel bound by traditional property law classifications. However,
few scholars attempt to explain how modem cases are decided. Lynn
himself concedes that this is a difficult question:
That modem courts in perpetuities cases are abandoning the
categories of future interests is to a fair degree demonstrable.
That they are assimilating functional equivalents can also be
shown. Courts treat contingent remainders, contingent execu-
tory interests, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry for
condition broken as interchangeable. The elusive line between
contingent and vested remainders is disappearing altogether. But
how judges decide cases in the absence of classification is not at
all clear.42
Nonetheless, after a brief speculation as to what moves courts, he
offers this answer:
The heart of the matter is whether or not the donor has violated
the spirit of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and modern courts,
like Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, sense that.43
The spirit of the Rule? I cannot follow Professor Lynn to this con-
clusion. What spirit-and what medium-has control of the seance?
The evidence which he presents does not show that judges or scholars
are in agreement about what constitutes the proper spirit. On what
side does the spirit descend in the following controversies: Should the
Rule be against inalienability of specific assets or against tying
up a quantum of wealth in trust, against practical inalienability or
absolute inalienability, against remote vesting in possession or remote
vesting in interest, against any possibility of remote vesting or any
probability of same?
Professor Lynn's use of a "spirit" standard to describe modem de-
cisions would not be so disturbing if there were some general agree-
ment about what that "spirit" is. But there is not. Take the recent
Tennessee case of Sands v. Fly,4 which flabbergasted orthodox analysts
and so confused the editors of A.L.R.2d that they annotated the case
with a note that has nothing whatever to do with any issue involved
in the case.45 (One of the true touches of Dada in the opinion is that
42. LYNN 28-29.
43. LYNN 32.
44. 200 Tenn. 414, 292 S.A.2d 706 (1956) (discussed in LYNN at 159-61).
45. Annot., 57 A.LR.2d 188, 197 (1958).
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the presently living remaindermen have, in the court's view, survived
the yet unborn life tenants!) Professor Lynn says, "Sands reaches an
acceptable result without careful analysis of the ultimate interests. ' 40
Acceptable by what standard-the spirit of the Rule?
In Sands the court upheld what it called "a very unjust will" where-
by the testatrix devised land to her only son (age 44) for his life, then
to her grandchildren for their lives, then in fee simple upon the death
of her own grandchildren to her nieces and nephews then living, with
substitutional gifts to the issue of the nieces and nephews or to the
surviving nieces and nephews or their issue. The son and the guardian
ad litem of the presently living grandchildren (ages 8, 7, 5, and 3)
attacked the will. The nieces and nephews refused to defend it. And
since the executor also assailed the will as void, an administrator ad
litem had to be appointed to defend it. Saying that all interests would
timely vest in interest or fail, the court permitted the land to be tied up
for the lives of the testatrix's grandchildren, some of whom were pos-
sibly not in being. Moreover, upon the death of the grandchildren the
land was to be taken from testatrix's descendants and transferred to
persons who would surely be "laughing heirs." If the result in this
case is acceptable to Professor Lynn, it is hard to understand what he
means by "spirit."47
I fear "spirit" is a deus ex machina which Lynn has constructed to
help us avoid facing up to some hard, intractable facts. First, too many
perpetuities decisions are devoid of policy considerations, are filled
with empty verbalisms and references to tautological doctrine, and
apparently are resolved by "the cantilena of lawyers." 48 Lynn occasion-
ally notes these facts: "Courts are affected by ... the eminence of the
authority gaining their attention"; 4 "Some courts in handling the
46. LYNN 161.
47. Professor Trautman, in discussing this case, said, "Survivorship of the last child
that Son may have seems to be the essential condition precedent of any recognizable
economic interest in the property on the part of the alternate takers and this is the very
kind of dead hand projection which the policy of the rule seeks to prevent." Trautman,
Wills, Trusts and Estates-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND L. REv. 1238, 1245-46 (1957).
The American Law of Property says of the case: "It would appear the gift can only have
been sustained on the basis that there was a separate divesting gift to the issue of the
named persons [a basis not referred to in the opinion]." 6 AMmUCAN LAw oF PaopraTr"
§ 24.27, at 86 n.4 (Supp. 1962). The case is criticized on policy as well as doctrinal grounds
in Note, 45 Ky. L.J. 704 (1957).
48. Gray saw this years ago. "A serious objection to the continuance of the old doctrines
of real property in the jurisprudence of to-day is that . .. the judges . . . are in danger
of being unduly governed by 'the cantilena of lawyers.'" GaY, supra note 2, at § 782,
Leach and Logan have included in their casebook a delightful "cantilena" case entitled
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Rule show a remarkable lack of competence."' 0 Second, and here is
the heart of the matter, what Professor Lynn undertook-a realistic
description of the decision-making process involving the Rule against
Perpetuities--cannot be done. Professor Lynn is an extremely well-
qualified researcher in this field, where he has been working for more
than fifteen years. Insofar as the book demonstrates that Lynn cannot
accurately and precisely describe the factors that move decision, and
must resort to a "spirit" to explain decisions, the book demonstrates to
my satisfaction that such description is impossible. I think it is im-
possible even if one uses as systematic and comprehensive an analytical
framework as Myres McDougal has proposed 5' and has available the
financial resources of the Ford Foundation and the intellectual re-
sources of the entire clan of American property professors (not to
mention the assistance of a dozen or so psychiatrists). There are a
number of reasons for the practical limits to comprehensive descrip-
tion:
(1) The lack of truly comprehensive information. Judicial opinions
do not give comprehensive information about possibly relevant
factors, including the characteristics of the claimants, the ex-
pertise of the judges, and the quality and teclmiques of advocacy.
(2) The inability to construct a satisfactory method for evaluating
all the variables in the decision-making process in a particular
case.
(3) The openness of any usable system of variables, which is always
in a state of discovery and redefinition.
(4) The costliness of comprehensive analysis.
(5) The inability to discover the policies of the community on which
all can agree.
(6) The inability to assay the honesty of opinions, when orthodox
doctrine can be used to reach opposite results.
From Lynn's study this conclusion seems irresistible: So long as the
Rule against Perpetuities remains in its present form, whether or not
modified by wait-and-see or cy pres, our ability to describe or predict
decisions comprehensively and accurately will have insurmountable
practical limitations.
50. LYNN 201.
51. McDoucAi, supra note 6.
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B. Lynn's Description of Reform Acts
The second major objective of Professor Lynn is to describe reform
of the Rule, both judicial and statutory, which has taken place since
1947. As Lynn points out, most of this reform is attributable to the
work of Professor Leach.5 2 Leach has influenced the courts in three
ways. First, his classic article, Perpetuities in a Nutshell,5 is the most
lucid and enjoyable introduction to the Rule. This and his later articles
illuminate a dry, technical subject with a lively, piquant style. Most
law students of the 30's, 40's, and 50's-now judges and legislators and
leading practitioners-remember Leach as the only person who wrote
anything comprehensible about the Rule. Second, his flood of persua-
sive articles54 advocating reform has dislodged lawyers from unques-
tioning acceptance of the old Rule and has created a ground receptive
to the seeds of reform. Third, Leach's stamp of approval on wait-and-
see and cy pres has made these doctrines more acceptable to the courts.
Where courts have been unwilling to adopt these doctrines without
legislative action, they have at least begun to construe instruments so
as to avoid violation of the Rule and to abandon Gray's "remorseless"
application.
Leach has also vigorously pushed legislative changes, which have
been adopted in various forms in many jurisdictions. Wait-and-see
statutes have been enacted in England,55 Western Australia, 0 Ontario,57
and Pennsylvania. 8 Wait-and-see and cy pres statutes have been en-
52. LYNN 193. "If one person can be credited with tempering Gray's Rule, that person
is Leach."
53. 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938). The article was updated in Leach, Perpetuities: The
Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1965).
54. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAry.
L. REV. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 LQ.
REv. 35 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HAsRY. L. REV. 1349(1954); Leach, An Act Modifying and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities, 39 MASS.
L.Q., Oct., 1954 at 15; Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 70 L.Q. REv. 478(1954); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124(1960); Leach, Perpetuities in Real Estate: Legislative Reform, 6 PRAc. LAW, DEC., 1960, at
36; Leach, Perpetuities in Real Estate: Let's Get the Rule on the Rails, ABA PROC. RA
PROF. PRoB. & TR. LAW, pt. II, 20 (1960); Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and
Statutory Correctives, 73 HARv. L. Rev. 1318 (1960); Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic
Age: the Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A.J. 942 (1962); Leach, Perpetuities:
Cy Pres on the March, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1381 (1964); Leach, Perpetuities: What Legisla-
tures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do About the Follies of the Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. REv.
351 (1965). See also W. B. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PEsRrrurrics (1957); J.
MoRms & W. B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2d ed. 1962).
55. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 3.
56. Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 11 Eliz. 2, No, 83, § 7
fV. Austl. 1962).
57. Bill 131, 27th Legis., 4th Sess., § 6 (Ont. 1966).
58. PA. ANN. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 301.4-5 (Purdon 1950).
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acted in New Zealand,5 9 Kentucky, 0 Ohio,0' Vermont,0 2 and Washing-
ton.63 Limited wait-and-see and cy pres statutes exist in Connecticut,4
Maine, 65 Maryland,66 and Massachusetts. 7 Cy pres statutes exist in
California,68 Missouri,6 9 and possibly in Idaho. A limited cy pres
statute exists in New York.71
In discussing reform Lynn carefully avoids the heated, and some-
times acrimonious, language that has characterized the battle for per-
petuities reform. He is neither in the reformers' camp nor in the non-
reformers' camp. He sees clearly that the perpetuities experts currently
are debating not policy but pragmatics. How can perpetuities reform
be achieved without making the Rule more complicated, unpredict-
able, and troublesome than it already is?72 The great difficulty with the
wait-and-see doctrine is how to select the measuring livesyt The fear-
some aspect of cy pres is that it apparently gives the court unfettered
discretion to remake a will.74 Both these reforms preserve the vested-
contingent dichotomy, laden with the verbal baggage of centuries."
The recent California legislation that exempts trusts from the Rule
against Perpetuities if they can be terminated by the beneficiaries is
replete with hidden tax problems and raises the prospect of perpe-
tuities policy enforcement by the federal Internal Revenue Commis-
sioner.7 6
59. Perpetuities Act, 13 Eliz. 2, No. 47 (N.Z. 1964).
60. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1963).
61. Senate Bill No. 13, effective October 24, 1967.
62. VT. ANN. STAT. tit. 27, § 501 (1967).
63. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.98.010-.030 (1967) (applicable to trusts only).
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 45-95 to -96 (1958).
65. Aftr. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101, 102 (1964).
66. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197A (Michie 1966).
67. MAss. LAWS AN. ch. 184A, §§ 1, 2 (1955).
68. CAL. CrVM CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1966).
69. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (Vernon Supp. 1966).
70. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957) (applicable to trusts only).
71. N.Y. Pins. PROP. LAw § 11-a (McKinney 1962); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42-b
(AcKinney Supp. 1967).
72. The Perpetuity Legislation Handbook (3d ed. 1967), prepared by the Committee on
Rules Against Perpetuities, ABA Sec. of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, contains
an excellent summary of the merits and defects of the various reforms and a useful col-
lection of reform legislation.
73. See the illuminating debate between Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last,
80 L.Q. REv. 486, 495-508 (1964) and Allan, Perpetuities: Whio Are the Lives in Being?,
81 L.Q. REv. 106 (1965).
74. Professor Olin Browder contends that the discretion under cy pres is little different
from the familiar discretion courts have in construing instruments, and that the proper
reformation will usually be suggested by the scheme of the donor. Browder, Construction,
Reformation and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MIca. L. REv. 1 (1963).
75. See Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Ifest? (pts. 1-2), 56
Mic. L. REv. 683, 887 (1958).
76. See Dukeminier, Perpetuities Revision in California: Perpetual Trusts Permitted,
5. CALm. L. Rrv. 678 (1967).
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Professor Lynn recognizes that every reform alternative has merits
and defects. His book is valuable because, instead of merely pointing
out the problems, he suggests sensible constructions to cure the defects.
Lynn's approach is to "read the perpetuities reform statutes whenever
possible as statements of policy, and ... [to] stretch them, if necessary,
to their outermost limits in order to achieve .. defensible results."71
In a chapter called "The Decline and Fall of Fantastic Possibilities," 78
he undertakes to apply wait-and-see and cy pres to most of the absurd
cases arising under the old Rule. He deals with the fertile octogen-
arian,79 the unborn widow, the administrative contingency, the pre-
cocious toddler,8 0 the fertile decedent,"' and the fortuitous adoption.
His exegesis of wait-and-see and cy pres is careful and penetrating. No
court operating under one of these statutes could fail to benefit from
Professor Lynn's clear and logical exposition of his preferred solutions.
III. Conclusion
So admirable a study as The Modern Rule Against Perpetuities
deserve a second volume suggesting where we ought to go from here.
With accelerating change in American society the "modern" Rule may
be completely out of date in another generation or so. As a result of
the different kinds of reform statutes, governing only within the enact-
ing jurisdiction, the old unified empire of the Rule has fallen apart.
Even if the unity of the old Rule was purely verbal and illusory in
reality, as Lynn believes, the modern Rule makes no pretense even to
verbal cohesiveness. Will the present trend toward diversity continue
and the great empire built by John Chipman Gray be divided into
many satrapies ruled by provincial panjandrums? Or will the unifying
force of technology bring on one ruler speaking a language foreign to
77. LYNN 4.
78. LYNN 57-88.
79. The Los Angeles Times, Dec. 10, 1966, § 1, at 17, col. 1, carried a story of a
fertile centenarian (man becomes father at age 109).
80. Newspaper stories of precocious pre-teens are continually appearing. See, e.g., The
Japan Times (Tokyo), Feb. 23, 1964, at 2, col. 7 (11-year-old Colombian girl gives birth);
Los Angeles Times, Mar. 19, 1964, § 1, at 2, col. 8 (l1-year-old African girl give, birth);
Los Angeles Times, Feb. 13, 1964, at 3, col. 7 (10-year-old Chicago girl gives birth and,
according to the obstetrician, "seemed confused by the experience").
81. Lynn deals only with sperm banks. LYNN 66-67. He assumes that only a male can
have a child conceived after his death, "Human ova banks comparable to sperm banks
may be within the range of reality," recently reported Dr. James L. Burks of the University
of Chicago. Dr. Burks foresees "using sperm from a sterile woman's husband to fertilize,
in vitro, frozen and thawed ova from another woman, and then transplanting the resulting
embryo into the sterile wife's uterus." Medical World News, Mar. 5, 196 , at 34,35, A
child born as a result of such process would not, of course, bear any genetic resemblance
to the foster mother who gave birth to him.
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Gray? Congress, which could enact tax laws conferring benefits for
conformity to a national standard, might be a unifying force.82 It
seems likely that the tax laws will be changed to take care of perpetual
trusts-which are possible now in California, Idaho, and Wisconsin-
once such trusts become widespread. s3 Instead of amending the In-
ternal Revenue Code to account for each state's perpetuities law, which
would cause headaches for everyone, perhaps Congress should give a
tax incentive for conformity to a Congressional rule against perpetu-
ities. We have been too mesmerized by the tumult of local reform
movements to give this possibility the hard thought it deserves.
JE-ssE DUKENIINIER, JR.-*,
The Lawyers. By Martin Mayer. New York: Harper and
Row, 1967. Pp. xvii, 586. $8.95.
Now entertain conjecture of a time, and see a young man in
Louisville, four years out of law school, hep to the rules of civil
procedure, a friend of a judge's clerk-at this moment newly
returned from lunch after a satisfying morning spent helping a
local haberdasher collect from a customer for a suit with two pairs
of pants. The young lawyer is picking his teeth and contemplat-
ing a newspaper when into his office walks his sister's husband's
niece, looking like hell with a bandaged jaw and a black eye and
two fingers in a cast. It seems that five nights before, her young
man, who travels, was in town with the company car (which is
registered in Ohio), and the two of them went across the river to
Indiana for a party. Around midnight, on their way back, their
car collided with an Indiana jalopy that three boys had "bor-
rowed" from a "friend". The young man was unharmed, and the
boys were only shaken up, but the young lady was thrown from
the car when the door on her side sprung open. She has just got
out of the hospital; she may lose her job as a ticket-seller for a
movie house; and plastic surgery may be required before other
young men take her to parties in Indiana. The lawyer, as her
uncle's wife's brother and a licensed attorney, signs her up, gives
82. Federal law was the primary force behind the recent emergence of a uniform income
accumulation period. The federal income tax advantages of a trust where the trustee has
power to accumulate income resulted in the repeal of almost all state statutes that
restricted the accumulation of income to a period shorter than lives in being plus twenty-
one years. See 6 AMEmRcAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 25.101-.118 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952, Supp.
1962); 5 R. PoWvLL, RE.AL PROPERTY 833-35 (1956).
83. See Dukeminier, supra note 76.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. K.B. 1948, Harvard Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1951, Yale University.
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her assurances he does not entirely feel, and wishes her Godspeed.
What does he do next?
The publisher's blurb describes The Lawyers as "a wide-ranging,
often anecdotal report on the law and its practitioners." It is in fact a
somewhat uneven tome, containing several brilliant descriptive passages
and generally illuminating accounts of what the author has seen and
heard, as well as some tiring stretches of turgid prose. Let this be
stressed at the outset, however, since it is easier to find fault than to
praise constructively: the task Mr. Mayer set himself is overwhelming,
if not impossible. But his is nonetheless an important book that can-
not be treated lightly or condescendingly, least of all ignored. For more
than five years the author, one of the most acute observers of the Amer-
ican scene, lived this book day and night. It is a labor of love, for both
his parents are lawyers, and there is a high seriousness, almost a moral
tone, in its attempt to avoid the glib and the flashy. That the attempt
occasionally fails does not matter.
The description, at its best, is superb. With marvelous accuracy
Mayer is able to make a series of significant points and tell a good story
at the same time. In two pages, for example, he sketches a portrait of
Professor Jaeger of Georgetown Law School, describes how most Amer-
ican law schools have been teaching since Langdell, exhibits the habits
of thought that are most prized in top law schools, and notes their
prejudices against evening schools. That brief vignette is, in effect, a
magnificent summary statement of how a good law school makes tough
lawyers out of liberal arts graduates, mere laymen.
It is hard for an author who is dealing with a big subject on a grand
scale to avoid the temptation to make the subject even bigger, the scale
even grander. Mayer succumbs. The book is not only about lawyers of
various shapes and sizes; it tries to deal with The Law itself-head-on.
And of course it is all but impossible to observe anything that is as all-
embracing as life, and then to put it all down on paper in an orderly
fashion even when the writer has the sharpness and the wit, the sheer
intelligence and the humanity, of a Martin Mayer. Even he admits that
"startling little is known systematically about the real world of the
lawyer, and even less is known about the purposes the society wishes
the lawyer to serve in the latter half of the twentieth century." Who,
one might ask, is any reviewer to berate the author for failing to reach
the stars? In spite of some shortcomings, this book does convey a sense
of the complex relationships between the various realms of the lawyer
and the universe that is the United States.
It would be both easy and cheap to brand Mr. Mayer "just a jour-
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nalist," with all that that phrase implies-just as easy as it is to think
of someone who has earned an LL.B. or passed a bar examination as a
lawyer pure and simple, with everyone else regarded as a non-lawyer.
(As Mayer points out, in form at least, once a lawyer, always a lawyer,
since admission to the practice of law is good for life unless specifically
revoked. And non-lawyers find themselves in the uncomfortable part
of the court room if they poach on the lawyer's territory.) It is, of
course, the aim of every professional group to define as many visible
differences as possible between itself and the outside world.
Nevertheless, it is plain that Mayer knows far more about the law
than most lawyers, even though he has not spent the requisite three
years at the gates of Valhalla. In fact, it is doubtful whether the book
would be any different if he happened to have the magic letters after
his name (LL.B. or J.D.?); certainly, no one should attack the book on
the grounds that its author is an outsider.
In fact, as David Riesman, a great admirer of this book, points out in
a letter to the reviewer, the very fact that Mayer is not a "licensed
practising attorney" may have its advantages: he takes nothing for
granted and he follows no standard orthodoxies. For example, one
would not expect a lawyer to write with such zest about the various legal
indexing and reporting services, which are a part of the world as he
knows it; and perhaps not belonging to the guild gives the author the
freedom to exhibit feeling and emotion.
Lawyers and journalists do have one thing in common: they are, if
anyone is, the last generalists of our society, willing to grapple with
any problem and confident that there is little material that they cannot
get a sense of, if not master. This can strike the outsider as cockiness.
It was Edward Levi, now Provost of the University of Chicago, who
stated, "We have substituted the law for the classics," and, as Mayer
reports, such men as Charles Reich of Yale and (it would seem) the
whole faculty of the University of Southern California Law School
sense a fragmented society's desperate need for a profession that is not
narrowly specialized. There is an obvious empathy in the book for the
lawyer "who can pull together all the expertise and tie up a program."
I wonder whether, on the other hand, a lawyer reading Mayer will
understand or approve of the desire, almost the obsession, to get the
picture big and to get it whole. (There are, of course, several lawyers
with the same passion; we need more.)
"If the laws could speak for themselves," George Savile, Marquis of
Halifax, opined almost three hundred years ago, "they would complain
of the lawyers in the first place." On the one hand, we all mouth pious
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platitudes about living under the law; and whenever problems arise,
legislatures are apt to pass a bill. On the other hand, as the author
points out, "public opinion polls invariably show that people who have
had occasion to be represented by a lawyer think less well of the pro-
fession than people who have never hired legal services." Mayer steers
a skillful course between shallow expos6 of the seamy side of the law
and pious rehearsal of the words of Gilbert and Sullivan:
The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent.
It has no kind of fault or flaw.
He calls the shots as he sees them without debunking what is of value.
In fact, one finishes the book with a renewed conviction that, when all
is said and done, the rule of law, however imperfect, does tend to
civilize behavior and force it into more rational patterns in a schizo-
phrenic and cruel world.
Mr. Mayer handles myth with considerable adroitness. The rhetoric
of the profession would have us believe that the lawyer, a servant of the
court, is concerned with overall justice and the public interest. To
some extent, of course, he is; but the book shows how most frequently
he is representing neither his own interests nor those of the society as
a whole, but rather those of his client. "He is on a mission for some-
one else... he is an advocate; his function is to see the possible resolu.
tion of a controversy in terms of a client's best interests." But this basic
contradiction poses societal problems that are hinted at rather than
discussed. And with all the thought that went into this book, there are
still some generalizations that are tantalizing-or plain annoying-
because they are unexplored and unsubstantiated; one never knows
whether they are genuinely illuminating or trite. "Law requires
punishment... law is a public profession... one man's rights are no
more and no less than other men's duties to him." Such broad state-
ments have value only in a carefully reasoned context that I sometimes
found thin or could not find at all. One cannot quite read this book
with the lawyer's assumptions that every word counts and that one
argument inevitably and inexorably leads to the next.
In areas where mythology and truth come close together, Mayer is
in his element. The chapter on the Supreme Court, for example, gives
a superb account of the role and place of that body in contemporary
American life-but why call that particular chapter "unscientific"
when the style and organization are the same as the rest of the book?
Some of those lawyers who pride themselves on being hardened realists
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will, no doubt, be offended by the emotion of the book's final pages,
in which Mayer describes the Warren Court and the Chief Justice
himself as the main hope for America's future as a civilized nation; I
was moved. It is encouraging to find someone who can be hard-nosed
and show genuine feeling at the same time.
His heart, then, as well as his head, is usually in the right place. But
he can be silly too. Consider, for example, the following piece of
foolishness: "Congratulating itself on its fairness and its grasp of
modem psychiatric evidence, the legal system within a few years will
probably be sending drunks not to jails, where they would be held,
cursed occasionally, fed and released, but to jails called hospitals where
they will be held, cursed occasionally, fed and released--after they have
been forcibly subjected to whatever fads for the treatment of alcoholics
are currently bemusing the medical profession." Surely Martin Mayer
is perceptive and compassionate enough to know that experimental
forms of treatment, however unscientific, are more likely to help
alcoholics than forms that are brutal and/or inappropriate.
The Lawyers is certainly not a compendium of statistics, but the
author includes enough ballpark numbers for the reader to get his
bearings. "There are," we are told, "300,000 lawyers in the United
States-one for every 250 of the labor force. No other nation has any-
thing like so many lawyers, either in absolute numbers or in propor-
tion to population." There is a sense of how different they all are, and
how labor is divided, but little discussion of why America has so many
more lawyers than, say, Japan or France or South America, or why
lawyers in this country handle matters that would be handled by some
other profession elsewhere. And as Mayer points out, "nearly one-half
the nation's practitioners have their offices in cities and towns with
under 200,000 population, while fewer than 40% work in cities with
a population of 500,000 or more." Why have these proportions re-
mained the same for over a decade?
As one might expect, this huge mass of lawyers leaves enormous
paper trials: "as against the roughly thirty thousand reported appellate
decisions each year in the United States, the English Law Reports offer
only three hundred. ... Each year produces about fifty thousand pages
of new statute law from Congress and the state legislatures." Arthur
Baer once remarked that if you laid all our laws end to end, there
would be no end. To what extent, I wonder, does the sheer number of
lawyers support-or generate-the peculiarly American notion that
passing another law will solve any problem that may arise? Or do we
have a chicken and egg situation here?
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In the preface, Mayer writes:
During the course of more than five years on this job, I have
come to feel that one can on occasion thoroughly understand how
a lawyer thinks about a given situation and still believe there are
more productive ways to think about it-indeed, there are areas
of human experience where lawyerlike habits of mind positively
inhibit understanding of what is actually happening.
Even the most elitist editor of the Harvard Law Review or the Yale
Law Journal might agree in theory, but I was a little disappointed that,
once the gauntlet had been thrown down, I could not find a for-
instance that satisfied. Occasionally, in this book, Mr. Mayer simply
bit off more than he could chew. When he took a look at the schools in
the late fifties, he told us what he saw, vividly and shrewdly; his points
were made through sharp descriptions, and he managed to avoid
philosophical tangles. In The Lawyers, however, he yielded to tempta-
tion. He was, as he put it, "in the big leagues," and he was swept into
the vortex instead of making controlled forays from the sidelines.
Perhaps his publisher should have done a little more editing.
The Lawyers, then, misses being a great book, but there is no doubt
in my mind that it has a lot to teach both lawyers and non-lawyers.
At its best, it is genuinely and provocatively illuminating; at its worst
it contains some rambling pages that lead nowhere in particular. As
with any book that deals with such an enormous range of topics, its
value to the reader depends somewhat on what he is able to bring to it
in the first place, since the author is not quite clear whom he is ad-
dressing-layman or initiate, small-town realtor or Supreme Court
Justice.
I hope that there will, one day, be a second edition, perhaps a little
shorter than this one, with more of the crispness that I remember from
The Schools. And I hope also that Mr. Mayer can spend some time
travelling outside the United States, and include some thoughts of a
comparative nature on what it is like to be a lawyer in one or two
other societies.
JONATHAN DAIBEt
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